Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” as (...) Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

Mysterium pansophicum -- Sex puncta theosophica -- Sex puncta mystica.

In contemporary art, a growing number of artists experiment with non-humans in their actual artworks. This paper examines the issues related to such practices with reference to Jakob von Uexküll’s analyses of the configuration of meaningful worlds by non-human animals, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze-Guattari’s interpretations of Uexküll’s ideas. Uexküll maintained that every living being lives in a world with meaning; Merleau-Ponty understood this claim as situating the beginning of culture in the creativity of non-humans; Deleuze and Guattari (...) emphasized the melodic and rhythmic dimension of this creativity, mainly interpreted as territorialization processes. These elements are paramount to understanding what is at stake with artworks featuring non-humans: considering projects proposals from Agnes Meyer-Brandis, Tomas Saraceno, Ana Maria Lopez Gomez and other contemporary artists, the conclusion is that an artwork featuring an encounter between two territorializing movements has the potential to transform the human range of perception. (shrink)

Der schlesische Spiritualist Johann Theodor von Tschesch (1595-1649) wurde bislang in Fachkreisen fast ausschliesslich als ein Nachfolger Jakob Böhmes wahrgenommen. Der Untersuchung von Tünde Beatrix Karnitscher gelingt es erstmals, ein differenzierteres Bild von Tschesch zu zeichnen. Durch intensive Recherche und mit grosser Akribie konnte eine Zusammenschau von bislang nicht zueinander in Beziehung gesetzten und zum Teil schwer zugänglichen Textcorpora zum Thema erfolgen und darüber hinaus am Lebenslauf von Tschesch eine Reihe gesellschaftlicher Phänomene sichtbar gemacht werden, die das 17. Jahrhundert (...) und besonders die Spiritualisten dieser Zeit charakterisieren. Karnitscher zeigt, wie Tscheschs wachsende Hinwendung zum geistigen Leben eine immer stärker werdende Spannung zwischen "Innen" und "Aussen" verursachte, welche sich im literarischen, gesellschaftlichen und geographischen Bereich beobachten lässt.0Zugleich leistet Karnitscher einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Erforschung der Traditionszusammenhänge zwischen Spiritualismus und Pietismus. (shrink)

Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit (...) our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there is at least a pro tanto reason to favor the control account of the right to privacy over the access account of the right to privacy. This conclusion is of interest due to its relevance for contemporary discussions related to surveillance policies. We discuss several ways in which the two accounts of the right to privacy can be improved significantly by making minor adjustments to their respective definitions. We then test the improved versions (...) of the two accounts on a test case, to see which account best explains the violation that occurs in the case. The test turns out in favor of the control account. (shrink)

To what degree can language be acquired from linguistic input alone? This question has vexed scholars for millennia and is still a major focus of debate in the cognitive science of language. The complexity of human language has hampered progress because studies of language–especially those involving computational modeling–have only been able to deal with small fragments of our linguistic skills. We suggest that the most recent generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) might finally provide the computational tools to determine empirically (...) how much of the human language ability can be acquired from linguistic experience. LLMs are sophisticated deep learning architectures trained on vast amounts of natural language data, enabling them to perform an impressive range of linguistic tasks. We argue that, despite their clear semantic and pragmatic limitations, LLMs have already demonstrated that human-like grammatical language can be acquired without the need for a built-in grammar. Thus, while there is still much to learn about how humans acquire and use language, LLMs provide full-fledged computational models for cognitive scientists to empirically evaluate just how far statistical learning might take us in explaining the full complexity of human language. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) often outperforms human doctors in terms of decisional speed. For some diseases, the expected benefit of a fast but less accurate decision exceeds the benefit of a slow but more accurate one. In such cases, we argue, it is often justified to rely on a medical AI to maximise decision speed – even if the AI is less accurate than human doctors.

In this paper, I defend what I call the ‘Inference Principle’. This principle holds that if an agent obtains some information legitimately, then the agent can make any inference she wants based on the information, without violating anyone’s right to privacy. This principle is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it constitutes a novel answer to the timely question of whether the widespread use of ‘data analytics’ to infer personal information about individuals is morally permissible. Second, it contradicts what (...) seems to be a common view of inferences’ ability to violate privacy rights. Third, it offers an account of the theoretically underdeveloped issue of what duties are engendered by the moral right to privacy with regard to inferred information. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an indirect argument for the Access Theory of privacy. First, I develop a new version of the rival Control Theory that is immune to all the classic objections against it. Second, I show that this new version of the Control Theory collapses into the Access Theory. I call the new version the ‘Negative Control Account’. Roughly speaking, the classic Control Theory holds that you have privacy if, and only if, you can control whether other people (...) know personal information about you. Critics of the Control Theory often give counterexamples, where privacy is either not diminished even though the claimant has lost control, or where privacy is diminished even though the claimant is in control. I argue that none of these alleged counterexamples work against the Negative Control Account. However, this is not a victory for the control theorist, because the Negative Control Account collapses into the Access Theory. The paper thus adds to the recent trend in the literature of favoring the Access Theory over the Control Theory. (shrink)

CATEGORY: Philosophy play; historical fiction; comedy; social criticism. -/- STORYLINE: Katherine, a neurotic American lawyer, meets Christianus for a philosophy session at The Late Victorian coffee shop in London, where they also meet Wendy the waitress and Baldy the player. Will Katherine be able to overcome her deep depression by adopting some of Christianus’s satisfactionist ideas? Or will she stay unsatisfied and unhappy by stubbornly sticking to her own neti-neti nothingness philosophy? And what roles do Baldy, Wendy, and the Okefenokee (...) Man-Monster have in this connexion? -/- TOPICS: In the course of this philosophy play, Katherine and Christianus discuss many things: friendship, a Renoir painting, global warming, elephant conservation, freemasons, Prince of Wales and his tiger-hunting experience in Nepal, Victorian Chartism and a Kennington Common daguerreotype, a Mortality Proof, and, last but not least, Baldy, Wendy, and the gory plot of the Okefenokee Man-Monster. -/- NOTES: This work features elaborate footnotes and comments (including full bibliographical references) by the author, to enhance the reader's experience of the play and its philosophizing characters. (shrink)

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative (...) Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy. (shrink)

This chapter explores the idea that the need to establish common knowledge is one feature that makes social cognition stand apart in important ways from cognition in general. We develop this idea on the background of the claim that social cognition is nothing but a type of causal inference. We focus on autism as our test-case, and propose that a specific type of problem with common knowledge processing is implicated in challenges to social cognition in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This (...) problem has to do with the individual’s assessment of the reliability of messages that are passed between people as common knowledge emerges. The proposal is developed on the background of our own empirical studies and outlines different ways common knowledge might be comprised. We discuss what these issues may tell us about ASD, about the relation between social and non-social cognition, about social objects, and about the dynamics of social networks. (shrink)

The legitimacy of conscientious objection to abortion continues to fuel heated debate in Italy. In two recent decisions, the European Committee for Social Rights underlined that conscientious objection places safe, legal, and accessible care and services out of reach for most Italian women and that the measures that Italy has adopted to guarantee free access to abortion services are inadequate. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health states that current Italian legislation, if appropriately applied, accommodates both the right to conscientious objection and (...) the right to voluntary abortion. One empirical argument used to demonstrate that conscientious objection does not create barriers to abortion is the “no correlation” argument, which the Italian Committee for Bioethics employed to demonstrate that no association exists between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion in Italy and to support the weak form of conventional comprise adopted by the Italian legislation to balance the conflict between women’ autonomy and healthcare professionals’ moral integrity. Conversely, we showed how the “no correlation” argument fails to demonstrate the absence of a relationship between the number of conscientious objectors and waiting times for voluntary abortion, and that the limitations of the “no correlation” argument itself demonstrate how it is still difficult to describe the real effect of conscientious objection on the access to abortion services and to evaluate the suitability of conventional compromise to effectively balance conflicting moral principles. Further studies are needed to better describe the relationship between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion. If new evidence would show that the increasing proportion of objectors does undermine the efficacy of the Italian law and the right of a woman to freely obtain a voluntary abortion, new ways will need to be found to address the conflict between moral principles and restrict the protection accorded to the principle of moral integrity. This would inevitably imply the need to constrain and to redefine the terms and conditions for claiming conscientious objection. (shrink)

Background The legitimacy of conscientious objection to abortion continues to fuel heated debate in Italy. In two recent decisions, the European Committee for Social Rights underlined that conscientious objection places safe, legal, and accessible care and services out of reach for most Italian women and that the measures that Italy has adopted to guarantee free access to abortion services are inadequate. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health states that current Italian legislation, if appropriately applied, accommodates both the right to conscientious objection (...) and the right to voluntary abortion. Main body One empirical argument used to demonstrate that conscientious objection does not create barriers to abortion is the “no correlation” argument, which the Italian Committee for Bioethics employed to demonstrate that no association exists between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion in Italy and to support the weak form of conventional comprise adopted by the Italian legislation to balance the conflict between women’ autonomy and healthcare professionals’ moral integrity. Conversely, we showed how the “no correlation” argument fails to demonstrate the absence of a relationship between the number of conscientious objectors and waiting times for voluntary abortion, and that the limitations of the “no correlation” argument itself demonstrate how it is still difficult to describe the real effect of conscientious objection on the access to abortion services and to evaluate the suitability of conventional compromise to effectively balance conflicting moral principles. Conclusion Further studies are needed to better describe the relationship between conscientious objection and waiting times for voluntary abortion. If new evidence would show that the increasing proportion of objectors does undermine the efficacy of the Italian law and the right of a woman to freely obtain a voluntary abortion, new ways will need to be found to address the conflict between moral principles and restrict the protection accorded to the principle of moral integrity. This would inevitably imply the need to constrain and to redefine the terms and conditions for claiming conscientious objection. (shrink)

Amphibian metamorphosis is a post‐embryonic process that systematically transforms different tissues in a tadpole. Thyroid hormone plays a causative role in this complex process by inducing a cascade of gene regulation. While natural metamorphosis does not occur until endogenous thyroid hormone has been synthesized, tadpoles are competent to respond to exogenous thyroid hormone shortly after hatching. In addition, even though the metamorphic transitions of individual organs are all controlled by thyroid hormone, each occurs at distinct developmental stages. Recent molecular studies (...) suggest that this competence of premetamorphic tadpoles to respond to the hormone and the developmental stage‐dependent regulation of tissue‐specific transformations are determined in part by the levels of thyroid hormone receptors and the concentrations of cellular free thyroid hormone. In addition, at least two genes, encoding a cytosolic thyroid hormone binding protein and a 5‐deiodinase, respectively, are likely to be critical players in regulating cellular free thyroid hormone concentrations. This review discusses how all of these molecuar components coordinate to induce amphibian metamorphosis in a correct spatial and temporal manner. These studies provde us with general clues as to how and why tissues become competent to respond to hormonal signals. (shrink)

Interest in sensory atmospheres and architectural and urban ambiances has been growing for over 30 years. A key figure in this field is acclaimed German philosopher Gernot Böhme whose influential conception of what atmospheres are and how they function has been only partially available to the English-speaking public. This translation of key essays along with an original introduction charts the development of Gernot Böhme's philosophy of atmospheres and how it can be applied in various contexts such as scenography, commodity aesthetics, (...) advertising, architecture, design, and art. The phenomenological analysis of atmospheres has proved very fruitful and its most important, and successful, application has been within aesthetics. The material background of this success may be seen in the ubiquitous aestheticization of our lifeworld, or from another perspective, of the staging of everything, every event and performance. The theory of atmospheres becoming an aesthetic theory thus reveals the theatrical, not to say manipulative, character of politics, commerce, of the event-society. But, taken as a positive theory of certain phenomena, it offers new perspectives on architecture, design, and art. It made the spatial and the experience of space and places a central subject and hence rehabilitated the ephemeral in the arts. Taking its numerous impacts in many fields together, it initiated a new humanism: the individual as a living person and his or her perspective are taken seriously, and this fosters the ongoing democratization of culture, in particular the possibility for everybody to participate in art and its works. (shrink)

Among the reasons that Whitehead is such an interesting philosopher is that his work resonates across philosophical traditions. This collection develops connections between Whiteheadian concepts and recent European thinkers. The purpose is not simply to compare, however, but, as editor Jeremy Fackenthal suggests, to develop a Whiteheadian thinking “in tandem” with European philosophers in order to create disruptions or “dislocations” in thought that can engender creative approaches to contemporary problems.One general feature of the book deserves mention at the outset, though (...) I will return to it later in the review: although phenomenology and hermeneutics are each represented in the volume, roughly half of the essays focus on the work of Gilles Deleuze (if we group these together with essays focused on “new materialism,” which is connected with Deleuze, the proportion is more like two-thirds). This will be no surprise, since Deleuze is the European philosopher who was most appreciative of Whitehead. And yet, the result is that the conversation with “continental philosophy” is highly selective.The book is organized into three parts, each comprised of three essays. In part 1, “Technological and Systematic Dislocations,” William S. Hamrick brings Whitehead into conversation with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of “the flesh” to suggest an ecological ontology capable of overcoming the instrumentalization of nature. Hamrick's strategy is to read Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty as contributing to an “ontological foundation” for a sustainable civilization (18). Bo Eberle writes about the “quantified self” suggested in new, wearable self-monitoring technologies. Drawing on Whitehead's notion of causal efficacy, Eberle argues that devices such as Fitbit give us access to bodily states that bypasses the standard ways we are aware of ourselves (i.e., through consciousness). He goes further to argue that, like all ways of knowing, wearable technologies are selective, and that the selection reflects the interests of the manufacturers and promotes a certain kind of subjectivity (in the case of Fitbit, a subjectivity that is oriented toward “getting your steps in”). Whitehead's epistemology thus enables the critic of wearable technologies to understand how contemporary experience and self-understanding is shaped not simply by recent technological mediations but by the material interests embedded in them. J.R. Hustwit and Carl Dyke take on what they call “activist” uses of Whitehead that naively (in their judgment) suggest that a non-relational substance metaphysics is to blame for most of our social ills. They employ the theory of complex adaptive systems in conversation with Whitehead and Antonio Gramsci to show that, in fact, achieving significant social change is far more difficult and even unpredictable than mere insertion of better ideas into public discourse. Dominant hegemonies have ways of adapting and absorbing attempts to undermine them. Here Hustwit and Dyke draw on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to suggest that resistance to the dominant hegemony is nevertheless always possible because of the vagueness of discourse, allowing a plurality of competing interpretations and thus fractures in the dominant hegemony. However, even this kind of resistance is impossible to control and its effects incapable of being entirely predicted. To the essay's titular question, “Can Whitehead save the world?” the authors answer, “No.”In part 2, “Animal/Human Dislocations,” Jeremy Fackenthal draws on the new materialism of Rosi Braidotti (and Deleuze) along with Whitehead to argue for a “process-relational” nomadism that culminates in a “becoming-imperceptible.” His reading together of Whitehead and Braidotti creates the opportunity to recast the former's concept of objective immortality in such a way that it does not refer to death so much as to being diffused into a relational network. The satisfaction of an actual occasion may be taken as its translation into its effects among its relations. Fackenthal argues that this becoming-imperceptible makes possible a sustainable presence within a fragile network of life. Deena M. Lin uses Whitehead, Braidotti, and Judith Butler to lay out a vision of human life as precarious and deserving attention, care, and solidarity. She presses this vision as a direct moral assault on US (Trump's) policy toward Syrian refugees. Going further, she draws on Braidotti's posthuman account of zoe to argue for universal connection and solidarity with all life that should foster, as the title of her essay puts it, “Welcoming of Syrian Life.” Tano Posteraro offers an intriguing essay drawing on Jakob von Uexküll's account of animal experience. Posteraro argues that Uexküll's notion of an animal's Umwelt, shaped by its distinctive perceptual apparatus, needs to be supplemented by Whitehead's notion of prehension to account for the active dimension of animal perception. Rather than a passive registering of animal environments, Posteraro argues that the latter are constructed, and that concepts (or conceptual prehensions) should be understood as tools with which such environments are constructed.In part 3, “Time, the World, and Abstraction,” three essays probe ways that Whiteheadian and Deleuzian themes may resonate critically and constructively. Kris Klotz brings the thought of Whitehead and Deleuze together to inquire about how alternatives to present social forms are envisioned. He argues that, for Whitehead, every actual occasion involves a selection of some features of the past, and, further, that every selection is also an abstraction from the concrete welter of influences impinging on it. For Whitehead, then, to envision alternatives involves a critique of abstractions, a reinstatement of the concrete plurality of possibilities. This, for Whitehead, is what rationality does: it works at restoring the concrete, and, with it, a series of alternatives that have been eclipsed. To this Whiteheadian analysis, Klotz adds Deleuze and Guattari's critique of “opinion.” For Deleuze and Guattari, opinion is not an idiosyncrasy but a consensus to which differences of experience are subjected. Philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, must always struggle against opinion in order to bring alternatives to light. These conceptions of reason/philosophy, Klotz argues, represent useful ways to critique inequalities and other social wrongs that are embedded in the social forms that are routinely taken for granted. Elijah Prewitt-Davis uses a scene from Buffy the Vampire Slayer, along with philosophical innovations of Foucault, Deleuze, and Whitehead, to offer a distinctive account of power. Prewitt-Davis calls attention to Deleuze's important book on Leibniz, The Fold, and to how Whitehead's concept of prehension lies at its center. The upshot is that power is not reduced to dominance but, instead, is at work wherever any occasion of experience persists amid the onslaught of the influence of other occasions. Power, as Deleuze wrote, is the capacity to be affected—and to decide how to constitute oneself anew. Keith Robinson offers a detailed account of Whitehead's epistemology along with a reading of Deleuze's analysis of temporality to suggest that there is a common trajectory that seeks to undermine what the title of the essay describes as the “Bifurcation of Nature” (i.e., the separation of natural phenomena and human experience) within the dominant Western philosophical tradition.There is much of value in the volume as a whole. Aside from staging what Spinoza might have called good encounters between Whitehead and a number of continental philosophers, enhancing the conceptual power of each, the contributors are able to make a case that these philosophical trajectories, when read together, have much to contribute to our understanding of and response to the pressing issues of the day. In addition, readers who are interested in the relationship between Whitehead and the new materialism will find this volume to be a helpful resource, stocked with fine examples of how to sharpen new materialist thinking with Whitehead and how to read contemporary contexts through these lenses. On the other hand, this book is not a handbook nor a comprehensive reference. The organizational logic behind its division into sections is murky and the amount of attention given to particular continental philosophers as opposed to others appears somewhat arbitrary: there are recent continental philosophers who get little to no attention at (Derrida, Malabou, Žižek, Agamben, Latour, Nancy, for example), several of whom might prove to be quite interesting to read “in tandem” with Whitehead. Perhaps that is just to say that there are many more essays to be written. (shrink)

This paper concerns the double standard debate in the ethics of AI literature. This debate essentially revolves around the question of whether we should subject AI systems to different normative standards than humans. So far, the debate has centered around the desideratum of transparency. That is, the debate has focused on whether AI systems must be more transparent than humans in their decision-making processes in order for it to be morally permissible to use such systems. Some have argued that the (...) same standards of transparency should be applied across the board, for AI systems and humans alike. Others have argued that we should hold AI systems to higher standards than humans in terms of transparency. In this paper, we first point out that there are structurally similar double standard debates to be had about other desiderata besides transparency, such as predictive accuracy. Second, we argue that when we focus on predictive accuracy, there are at least two reasons for holding AI systems to a lower standard than humans. (shrink)

This paper explores the added value of studying intra- and inter-speaker variation in grammaticalisation based on idiolect corpora. It analyses the usage patterns of the English let alone construction in a self-compiled William Faulkner corpus against the backdrop of aggregated community data. Vast individual differences (early Faulkner vs. late Faulkner vs. peers) in frequencies of use are observed, and these frequency differences correlate with different degrees of grammaticalisation as measured in terms of host-class and syntactic context expansion. The corpus findings (...) inform general issues in current cognitive-functional research, such as the from-corpus-to-cognition issue and the cause/consequence issue of frequency. They lend support to the usage-based view of grammaticalisation as a lifelong, frequency-sensitive process of cognitive automation. To substantiate this view, this paper proposes a self-feeding cycle of constructional generalisation that is driven by the interplay of frequency, entrenchment, partial sanction and habituation. (shrink)

In his Knowledge and Belief (1962), Hintikka establishes his system of epistemic logic with the KK (Knowing that One Knows, in symbols, Kp→KKp) principle (KK for short). However, his system of epistemic logic and the KK principle are grounded upon his strong notion of knowledge, which requires that knowledge is infallible, that is, it makes further inquiry pointless, and becomes ‘discussion-stopper’; knowledge implies truth, to wit, cognitive agents will not be mistaken in their knowledge; cognitive agents will be ‘perfect logicians’, (...) i.e. they have infinitive capability of logical inference. Hintikka calls the argument for KK from the strong notion of knowledge as the ‘transcendental argument’ for KK. Obviously, the strong notion of knowledge is far away from our ordinary conception of knowledge; based on such a strong sense of knowledge, epistemic logic has met the problem of logical omnipotence, and is difficult to apply in our ordinary cognitive practice. Moreover, there is no close connection of the KK principle with internalism or externalism. (shrink)

EDITOR’S ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the Laozi from the perspective of the history of thought. Rather than trying to establish one correct edition and interpretation of Lao Zi’s work, Wang Bo traces the evolution from a political interpretation toward a more esoteric and life-cultivating reading. He shows how these different interpretations may have influenced the text itself. Focusing on differences between the recently acquired Peking University Han Bamboo Slips version and the transmitted edition, he analyzed two cases of remarkable variants: the (...) description of the Way as “profuse” versus “hidden,” and “having desire” versus “having the Way.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PRZYWARA AND VON BALTHASAR ON ANALOGY ERICK PRZYWARA'S major work is entitled Analogia Entis: Metaphysil:,, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus.1 As we will explain, it is especially the subtitle, " Basicstructure and Overall-rhythm", which is important in understanding the type of metaphysics he proposes. An explicit treatment of analogy by Hans Urs von Balthasar may be found in a se:des of two articles, " Analogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie (...) und Natur ", both of which carry the subtitle, " A clarification of the theological principles of Karl Barth " (1944-1945).2 They later become the basis of two important sections of Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie.3 The first becomes part of Balthasar's demonstration on Barth's "turn to analogy ".4 The second becomes part of presentation of Catholic" thought-form": "The concept of nature in Catholic theology". This context, the dialogue with Barth and Catholic theology in relationship to Barth, is essential for understanding Balthas,ar's views on analogy-as well as his relationship to Erich Przywara, anotheT dialogue partner of Barth. The "one concrete order of salvation", as 1 Anafogia En-tis. (AE) Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962. Second edition. The first edition (Munich: Koesel & Pustet, 1932), however, lacks this subtitle. It is called: Analogia Entis. JJfetaphysik. I. Prinzip. The new subtitle is a response to a "misunderstanding" (e.g., Barth's accusation) that analogia entis was only a metaphysical principle. Przywara also clarifies the sense in which analogy can be called a "principle" in the new forward to the second edition (p. 5), as well as in a new ending on p. 210. 2Both in Divus Thomas: the first in #22 (1944), 171-216; the second in # 23 (1945)' 3-56. 3 Cologne: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1951. 4Cf. "Die Wendung zur.Analogie", 93-123; as well as "Die Vollgestalt der Analogie", 124-180. Balthasar acknowledges his indebtedness to Przywara in the enlarged treatment of analogy in Barth: cf. p. 10 ancl p. 404 n.3 (for the section on the" concept of nature in Catholic theology.") 473 474 JAMES V. ZEITZ, S.J. the place where analogy thinking must begin and end, is typical of both Przywarn and Balthasar-and reflects undoubtedly the influence of Barth on bot1h of these Catholic and (at the time) Jesuit theologians. To start at an earlier stage, however, the real issue of analogy, in both Przywa;ra and Balthasar's writings is the God question. How can we maintain God's transcendence as a true ' other ' in relation to immanence-the one concrete order where Jesus Christ is already present? This is first of all a prroblem for any theological method. The starting point and language which proceeds from this starting point must allow for transcendence within immanence. Thus Balthasar's aibove-mentioned work on analogy discusses the problem using the rubric of the time, a " concept of nacbure " in relationship to Ubernatur. His question is: what concept of nature is able bo relate to Ubernatur, while remaining truly a creaturely concept of nature? His thesis is that nature cannot be abstract or "pure " in an 18th century, secularized philosophical sense (e.g. Baius), but-in conformity with the whole tradition of the Ohurch Fathers, where nature means the whole human condition-the concept of nature is always already analogous, since ' rnan ' as creature can never stand aside from his already given, concrete nature within the order of salvation.5 Przywara had already prepared the way for this by insisting on a creaturely metaphysics leading to a theological metaphysics, where analogy is the adequate method. Besides the theological method, however, there is the problem of transcendence within one's understanding of Christ and the biblical revelation of the New Testament. Is there really a place for what can only be revealed and received? Or, to state the question in Balthasar's terms: how is the "one, concrete order", where Jesus Christ is already pa,rt of our history, 5 Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". Eine Diskussion zwischen Hans Urs von Balthasar und Engelbert Gutwenger. ZKTh vol. 75, 1953. 452461. In this debate, Balthasar further clarifies what he had said in Durstellung, in response to Gutwenger... (shrink)

Jin Yuelin (1895?1984), a Chinese logician and philosopher, is greatly influenced by Hume's and Russell's philosophies. How should we respond to Hume's problem of induction? This is an important clue to understand Jin's whole philosophical career. The first section of this paper gives a brief historical review of Russell and Jin. The second section outlines Hume's skeptical arguments against causality and induction. The third section expounds Russell's justification of induction by discussing his views on Hume's skepticism, causality, principle of induction, (...) and empirical postulates. The fourth section clarifies Jin's justification of induction by discussing his critique of Hume's epistemology and his arguments for the reliability of causality and the eternal truth and apriority of the principle of induction. The final section compares Jin's justification of induction with Russell's and concludes that there are similarities and differences between their projects and that both their attempts fail. This paper takes the similar responses to the problem of induction by Jin and Russell to demonstrate the communication that there has been between Chinese philosophers and the Western ones. (shrink)

Comparison of behavioural measures of consciousness has attracted much attention recently. In a recent article, Szczepanowski et al. conclude that confidence ratings predict accuracy better than both the perceptual awareness scale and post-decision wagering when using stimuli with emotional content . Although we find the study interesting, we disagree with the conclusion that CR is superior to PAS because of two methodological issues. First, the conclusion is not based on a formal test. We performed this test and found no evidence (...) that CR predicted accuracy better than PAS . Second, Szczepanowski et al. used the present version of PAS in a manner somewhat different from how it was originally intended, and the participants may not have been adequately instructed. We end our commentary with a set of recommendations for future studies using PAS. (shrink)

Jin Yuelin 金嶽霖 was a Chinese philosopher and logician. From 1914 to 1920 he studied at the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University, and received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia in 1920. From 1921 until 1925, he studied in Europe and visited Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, among other countries. During these years, he studied at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences and at the University of Cambridge. At the end of 1925, Jin returned to (...) China and soon became a professor at Tsinghua University, where he began teaching logic in 1926. In 1931–1932, Jin went to Harvard University as a visiting scholar to study logic with the logician Henri M. Sheffer... (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that because of the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the secret ballot is now much less effective at protecting voters from voting related instances of social ostracism and social punishment. If one has access to vast amounts of data about specific electors, then it is possible, at least with respect to a significant subset of electors, to infer with high levels of accuracy how they voted in a past election. Since the accuracy levels of Artificial Intelligence (...) are so high, the practical consequences of someone inferring one’s vote are identical to the practical consequences of having one’s vote revealed directly under an open voting regime. Therefore, if one thinks that the secret ballot is at least partly justified because it protects electors against voting related social ostracism and social punishment, one should be morally troubled by how Artificial Intelligence today can be used to infer individual electors’ past voting behaviour. (shrink)

In this article, we show how it is possible to lawfully buy an election. The method we describe for buying an election is novel. The key things that make it possible to buy an election are the existence of public voter registration lists where one can see whether a given elector has voted in a particular election, and the existence of Big Data Analytics that with a high degree of accuracy can predict what a given elector will vote in an (...) upcoming election. Someone interested in buying an election can enter an employment contract with all, or some of, the opponent electors where these electors are paid to do a job that prevents them from voting. By purchasing access to the public voter registration lists, it is possible to verify ex-post whether the opponent electors that one has signed a contract with have abstained. In the last two sections of the article, we discuss several barriers that can undermine an attempt to buy an election in the manner we identify. (shrink)

From the vantage point of comparative philosophy, this anthology explores how analytic and "Continental" approaches in the Western and other philosophical traditions can constructively engage each other and jointly contribute to the contemporary development of philosophy.

The paper is concerned with the semantics and metaphysics of events and facts, particularly when they are claimed to be causal relata. I relate these issues to various well-known analyses of causation. The approach to the analysis of events is the property exemplification theory. I defend Kim's fine-grained individuation of events against most of Bennett's objections to it, but agree with Bennett that it is too fine-grained to provide a description of our ordinary thought and talk about events, including causal (...) statements. In the final part of the paper, I attempt to show that we need to distinguish between two different senses of 'fact': the term can mean both a true proposition and a situation (truthmaker). I try to show that Bennett seems to hold that facts in the first sense are causal relata. I argue that this view either amounts to a causal irrealism or to a conflation of epistemology with ontology. (shrink)

In this article I intend, on the basis of some previous relevant works on the issue, to further examine a range of conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at the relation between distinct methodological perspectives in comparative-engagement exploration in philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in the global context, distinct approaches in philosophy can be engaged in order toconstructively talk to each other and make a joint contribution to the development of (...) philosophy and society. (shrink)